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Abstract
Most tra¢ c congestion models assume that agents make trip-timing
decisions independently and receive payo¤s at the origin and destination
that do not depend on whether other agents are present. We depart from
this paradigm by considering a variant of Vickreys bottleneck model of
the morning commute in which individuals live as couples and value time
at home more when together than when alone. We show that the costs of
congestion can be higher than for a comparable population of individuals
living alone. The costs can be even higher if spouses collaborate with
each other when choosing their departure times. To calibrate the model
we estimate trip-timing preferences for married and unmarried men and
women in the Greater Paris region.
Jel Classifications: D11, D70, R41.
Keywords: departure-time decisions; congestion; schedule delay costs;
couple decision making; Pareto e¢ ciency; collective models.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Vickrey (1969) there has been growing interest in
trip-timing decisions and the dynamics of tra¢ c congestion. This has led to
burgeoning literatures in transportation economics, transportation engineering,
and regional science on the development of dynamic and operational models of
commuting and non-commuting behavior (de Palma and Fosgerau, 2011).
In most of this literature it is assumed that agents make trip-timing decisions
independently and receive payo¤s at the origin and destination that do not de-
pend on whether other agents are present. Yet many activities at work, at home,
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yCorresponding author: Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia,
2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z2. E-mail:
robin.lindsey@sauder.ubc.ca Voice: 1-604-822-3323; Fax: 1-604-822-9574
zThEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 Bd. du Port, 95011, Cergy Cedex, and Ecole
Polytechnique, FRANCE. Email: nathalie.picard@u-cergy.fr.
1
and elsewhere can only be undertaken collaboratively (e.g. business meetings,
team sports). Other activities such as leisure interests are more productive or
enjoyable when other people are present. Models are being developed that at-
tempt to deal with the need for people to be present simultaneously to engage
in synergistic activities. Some models also consider the negative externalities
that interactive activities induce such as congestion and pollution. Such models
are challenging because of the time dimension involved, and the combinatorial
explosion in the number of possible decisions by interacting agents. Positive
and negative externalities are sometimes taken into account in numerical mod-
els (but with somewhat ad-hoc behavior), or in operations research models (for
example, when two people have to meet as in Fosgerau et al. (2014)). Research
on activity analysis is making inroads (see, for example Bhat and Pendyala,
2005, Timmermans and Zhang, 2009, and Pinjari and Bhat, 2011), but much
remains to be done.
In this paper we focus on interactions and synergies that occur within the
family, and examine their implications for trip-timing decisions and tra¢ c con-
gestion. We consider a specic setting: two-person households and the morning
commute. Individuals value the presence of their spouse, and enjoy a marital
premiumin utility when they are home together. One person leaves for work
while their spouse is home. The second spouse leaves for work later, works
at home, or does not work. In choosing when to depart, the rst spouse im-
poses both an externality on his/her spouse and a tra¢ c congestion externality
on commuters outside the household. Our analysis focuses on two composite
questions. First, how does the marital premium a¤ect trip-timing decisions and
social welfare? Second, how does cooperative or altruistic behaviour between
couples a¤ect the utility of each person and social welfare? It is intuitively clear
that cooperative behaviour within couples should increase the well-being of at
least one member of the couple. However, given unpriced tra¢ c congestion it is
not obvious whether this limited form of cooperation is socially benecial.
To describe household trip-timing preferences and the dynamics of tra¢ c
congestion we use a version of Vickreys (1969) bottleneck model due to Vick-
rey (1973) in which agents maximize utility rather than minimize travel costs.
Our variant of the model incorporates two elements that are important for fam-
ily relationships. One is that, as Becker (1991) notes, spouses are generally
altruistic to each other. We assume each spouse values the utility of the other
spouse without actually deriving utility from the spouses utility directly. This
is consistent with what is sometimes referred to as paternalistic (Pollak, 1988)
or nondeferential (Pollak, 2003) preferences.1
The second element is that, since spouses live together and know each other
very well, their decisions are likely to be Pareto-optimal in the sense that
the well-being of one spouse cannot be improved without making the other
spouse worse o¤. In his collective model, Chiappori (1988) showed that when
spouses make Pareto-optimal decisions, they jointly behave as if they maximize
1The case in which individuals do obtain direct utility from other peoples utility is usually
referred to as caring preferences.
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a weighted sum of their (selsh) utilities where the weights are referred to as
Pareto weights.2 Pareto-optimality is consistent with the idea that spouses are
able to implement any agreement that is mutually benecial.
Collective models are increasingly used in the economics literature to study
household labor supply and consumption decisions, and they hold promise for
transportation applications too. For example, Chiappori et al. (2011) disen-
tangle the roles of Pareto weights and spousesvalues of time in a residential
location model. In their model, spousesworkplaces are predetermined, and
residential location determines spousess commuting times. See de Palma et al.
(2014) for a recent survey on family models in transportation and time use lit-
erature, and Picard et al. (2014) for another survey on family models oriented
towards residential location, land use, and transport interaction.
Two recent studies that use a variant of the Vickrey (1973) bottleneck model
examine scenarios involving endogenous trip-timing preferences that resemble
ours in some respects. One is Fosgerau and Small (2014) who study the dynamics
of morning commute tra¢ c congestion when agglomeration economies exist both
at work and in nonwork activities. Fosgerau and Small adopt an aggregate
specication of these economies by assuming that worker productivity increases
with the total number of people in the population simultaneously at work, and
also that utility elsewhere (e.g., at home) is an increasing function of the total
number of people simultaneously present at the non-work location. By contrast,
in our model synergies exist only within couples that each comprise a negligible
fraction (i.e., measure zero) of the total traveling population.
The other study by Gubins and Verhoef (2011/2014) examines the e¤ects
of using teleworking technology at home on morning commute departure-time
decisions. Gubins and Verhoef assume that the technology increases utility
of being at home in much the same way as marriage increases utility in our
model. They assume that workers decide individually whether to adopt the
technology. Thus, in contrast to Fosgerau and Small (2014), where trip-timing
preferences depend on collective decisions, in Gubins and Verhoef preferences are
determined by individual technology adoption decisions. Gubins and Verhoef
derive both the equilibrium and socially optimal penetration rates. They show
that adoption causes departures to begin later. The reason is similar to that in
our model, but the welfare analyses in the two papers di¤er.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the Vickrey
(1973) model for single (independent) individuals, and derives the equilibrium
which serves as a benchmark for the equilibria with couples. Section 3 de-
rives the equilibrium for a population of couples with a man and a woman
whose utilities are interdependent in the sense that each person values his or
her spouses company at home. The departure time of the spouse who leaves
home rst (assumed to be the man) a¤ects both his own utility and the utility
of his spouse. Following the collective model approach, the household jointly
maximizes a weighted sum of the spousesutilities. The weight on the mans
utility is normalized to 1, whereas the weight on the wifes utility is quantied
2Chiappori (1992) later extended this result to the case of caring preferences.
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by a nonnegative Pareto weight. Section 4 considers the polar case of selsh
or noncooperative behavior in which the Pareto weight is 0, in which case
the man maximizes his own utility. Section 5 provides a parallel analysis for
cooperative behavior in which the wifes Pareto weight is positive. Section
6 uses data from a survey in the Greater Paris region to estimate trip-timing
preferences including the marital premiums of men and women. We use the
estimates to assess how marriage and cooperation between couples a¤ect the
costs of tra¢ c congestion. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the main
results and ideas for further research.
2 Individuals living alone
In the benchmark regime individuals live alone and do not interact directly
although their equilibrium utilities are interdependent because of tra¢ c con-
gestion. A continuum of N identical individuals commute alone by car from a
common origin to a common destination connected by one road with capacity s
that is subject to bottleneck queuing delay.3 Free-ow travel time on the road is
normalized to zero. We model a portion of the day, starting at time zero when
everybody is at home and nishing at time T after everyone who commutes is
at work.
Let t0 be the time when departures from the origin begin, and r the aggregate
departure rate. A person departing at time td experiences queuing delay of:
q
 
td

= 1s
hR td
u=t0
r (u) du  s (td   t0)
i
:
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to td yields
dq
 
td

dtd
=
r
 
td
  s
s
:
Arrival time, ta, is related to departure time by the equation ta = td + q
 
td

.
Hence
dta
dtd
=
d
 
td + q
 
td

dtd
=
r
 
td

s
: (1)
Individuals derive a ow of utility that is activity-specic. Three activities
are considered: time spent at home, time spent driving to work, and time
spent at work. Individuals have a common desired arrival time at work, t.
To simplify the analysis and facilitate comparisons with the bottleneck model
literature, utility is assumed to be proportional to the duration of each activity
so that preferences can be expressed per unit of time. Unit utilities are denoted
as follows: I for time at home,  for time in the car, E for time at work
before t, W for time at work during regular hours, and P for time missed at
work due to late arrival. Arriving late at work therefore causes a utility loss per
minute of L = W   P . The unit utilities are ranked as follows:
3A notational glossary is found at the end of the paper.
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Figure 1: Trip-timing preferences and implied costs before marriage. Based on
Gubins and Verhoef (2011/2014) and Tseng and Verhoef (2008).
Assumption 1 (Parameter rankings for individuals)
L > I > E > : (2)
These rankings have intuitive interpretations:
E > : time spent at work early is valued more highly than time spent
driving.4
I > : time spent at home is valued more highly than time spent driving.
In the traditional cost-minimizing approach in the bottleneck model, the unit
cost or value of travel time (VOT) is denoted I  I   .
I > E : time spent at home is valued more highly than time spent at work
before t. People therefore prefer not to work more than their regular work
hours at the expense of time at home. In the cost-minimizing approach, the
unit cost of arriving early is I  I   E .
L > I : time spent at work after t is valued more highly than time spent at
home. People therefore prefer not to arrive at work late. In the cost-minimizing
approach, the unit cost of arriving late is I  L   I .
The correspondence between the utility parameters and the cost parameters
is shown in Figure 1.5
4The assumption vE > v implies that individuals do not dawdle on the way to work, and
would take the shortest route if they had a choice of route.
5Figure 1 replicates, except for notation, Figure 1 in Gubins and Verhoef (2011/2014)
which, in turn, is based on Tseng and Verhoef (2008).
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2.1 Equilibrium departure rates
In equilibrium, individuals depart from home over a connected time interval
[t0; te]. The rst person arrives at work early, and the last person arrives late.
The departure time for which someone arrives on time (at t) is denoted ~t
where ~t 2 (t0; te). Individuals who depart during the interval [t0; ~t) arrive early
(denoted by subscript E) and receive a utility UE
 
td

= Itd + 
 
ta   td+
E (t   ta) + W (T   t), or
UE
 
td

=
 
I    td +     E ta + Et + W (T   t) : (3)
Individuals who depart during the interval (~t; te] arrive late, denoted by sub-
script L, and receive a utility UL
 
td

= Itd + 
 
ta   td + P (ta   t) +
W (T   ta), or (using vL = vW   vP )
UL
 
td

=
 
I    td +     L ta + Lt + W (T   t) : (4)
The last two terms in (3) and (4) do not depend on departure or arrival times.
The rst term is the same, and the second term di¤ers only in that parameter
E appears for early arrival and parameter L for late arrival. During a time
interval in which departures occur, utility must be constant. Di¤erentiating (3)
and (4) with respect to td, and using eq. (1), this implies:
rIE =
I   
E    s > s; (5)
rIL =
I   
L    s < s; (6)
where superscript I denotes the equilibrium with independent or single individ-
uals. Given L > I > E as per Assumption 1, the equilibrium departure rate
exceeds bottleneck capacity during early arrivals and is below capacity during
late arrivals. Queuing delay therefore evolves over time to o¤set the advan-
tage of arriving at work closer to the preferred time, and hence to maintain the
equal-utility condition while individuals are departing.
The on-time departure time, et, is dened by the condition
et+ rIE   s
s
 et  t0 = t;
which gives: etI = E   
I    t
 +
I   E
I    t0: (7)
2.2 Equilibrium trip timing and utility
In equilibrium, all individuals derive the same utility although the composition
of utility di¤ers from person to person. Equilibrium utility is derived using two
conditions.
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The rst condition is that the rst and last individuals to depart have the
same utility: UE (t0) = UL (te). From eqs. (3) and (4) this gives: 
I    t0 +     E t0 + Et =  I    te +     L te + Lt: (8)
The second condition is that the departure period is just long enough for every-
one to pass the bottleneck. Since the road is used at full capacity throughout
the departure period,
s (te   t0) = N: (9)
Equations (8) and (9) can be solved for the equilibrium values of t0 and te:
tI0 = t
   
L   I
L   E ; (10)
tIe = t
 +
I   E
L   E ; (11)
where   N=s. The on-time departure time is solved by substituting (10) into
(7): etI = t    I   E  L   I
(I   ) (L   E) : (12)
The number of people who arrive early is
N IE = r
I
E
 etI   tI0 = s  t   tI0 = L   IL   EN; (13)
and the number who arrive late is
N IL = r
I
L
 
tIe   etI = s  tIe   t = I   EL   EN: (14)
Substituting (10) into (3) (or (11) into (4)) yields
U I = It + W (T   t) 	I; (15)
where 	I  (
I E)(L I)
L E =
II
I+I
. If there were no congestion, equilibrium
utility would be given by the rst two terms in (15). The last term corresponds
to the disutility or cost of congestion:
CI = 	I: (16)
3 Couples living together
We now extend the model to accommodate men and women. There are N
men identied by subscript m, and N women identied by subscript w. The
men all work and commute on the same route which has a bottleneck with a
ow capacity of sm. Men have a common work start time of tm, and preferences
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consistent with Assumption 1. All the formulae derived in Section 2 for N single
individuals therefore apply to men. Before marriage, men incur a congestion
cost of:
CIm = 	
I
mm (17)
where m  N=sm, and 	Im  (
Im Em)(Lm Im)
Lm Em .
Having lived apart, men and women now marry to form N couples.6 Each
woman in a couple does one of three things: She may work out of home, she may
work at home, or she may not work. Two additional assumptions are required
if she works out of home. First, she commutes on a di¤erent route than men
so that men and women do not impede each other on the road.7 Second, she
leaves home after her husband. This implies that her utility is a¤ected by his
departure-time decision, but her departure-time choice (if she works) does not
a¤ect him. For the purpose of comparing travel before and after marriage, it is
thus unnecessary to describe womens travel.8
Marriage is assumed to be agreeable in the sense that spouses value time
spent at home more when together than when alone.9 This assumption is for-
malized by supposing that utility per unit time while at home with a spouse
is Mm  Im for men, and Mw  Iw for women, where superscript M denotes
married. The additional marginal utility derived from a spouses presence will
be called the marital premium and written m  Mm   Im for men, and
w  Mw   Iw for women.10
Intuition strongly suggests that benet parameters vi, Ei and 
L
i , i = m;w,
are the same before and after marriage, since neither driving nor being at work
early or late involve the spouse. The unit cost parameters for married men
become Mm  Mm   m, Mm  Mm   Em, and Mm  Lm   Mm . For men, the
VOT rises by Mm   Im = Mm   Im = m (the marital premium), the cost of
arriving early at work rises by m, and the cost of arriving at work late falls
by m. These changes are shown in Figure 2.
To allow for cooperative behavior within couples we consider a collective
model a la Chiappori in which spouses coordinate to choose their departure
time(s) in order to jointly maximize a sum of their utilities, weighted by Pareto
weights. The mans Pareto weight is normalized to 1, and the womans weight
6Same-sex couples can be accommodated in the model with minor changes in notation.
7This assumption greatly simplies the analysis. Equilibria are much more complicated to
derive if men and women use the same route.
8The analysis is unchanged if the roles of men and women are reversed. We assume that
men leave home for work before women because this is true of a majority of couples in our
dataset. In a preliminary version of this paper we treated women in the same way as men by
assuming that all women work, have a common work-start time, tw, and traverse a common
bottleneck with capacity sw. We further assumed that tw > tm and that all women leave
home after their husbands. Adopting this specication introduced additional notation and
algebra without a¤ecting any results of interest.
9There is little reported empirical evidence to evaluate this assumption. In support of
it, Bradley and Vovsha (2005) nd that individuals generally derive additional utility from
joint participation, both in mandatory activities (e.g., traveling to work) and non-mandatory
activities (e.g., staying at home). In Section 6 we present some new evidence.
10The marital premium can include utility from the presence of children at home.
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Figure 2: Trip-timing preferences and implied costs for men after marriage
is denoted by   0. Noncooperative behavior corresponds to the limiting case
 = 0.
Since a mans utility does not depend on his wifes departure time, the
womans departure time (if she works) does not depend on the womans Pareto
weight (or, equivalently, bargaining power). However, the wifes utility does
depend on her husbands departure time so that the mans departure time se-
lected by the couple depends on . Since the wife is home when her husband
leaves for work, her husband confers a benet on her of w for each minute he
delays leaving home. Following Chiappori (1988), the man behaves as ifhe
attaches a weight w to this benet. It is assumed that the man does not
derive personal utility from his wifes utility.11 This assumption is critical for
assessing the welfare e¤ects of cooperation.
Nevertheless, the man behaves as if his marginal value of time spent at home
rises to Mm + w which causes further shifts of 
M
m , 
M
m , and 
M
m . (To avoid
clutter, these shifts are not shown in Figure 2.) To assure that the equilibrium
early departure rate of men is nite for all values of , the unit benet rankings
in Assumption 1 must be revised, and the rankings become:
Assumption 2 (Parameter rankings for men)
vLm > v
M
m + w  vIm > vEm > vm: (18)
11The man is therefore assumed to have paternalistic or nondeferential preferences rather
than caring preferences.
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3.1 Equilibrium departures
The equilibrium trip timing and departure rates for married men are derived in
the same way as in Section 2. The formulas can be obtained from the formulas
for single individuals simply by adding subscript m, and replacing Im with
Mm + w. The solution is:
rMmE =
Mm + w   m
Em   m
sm > sm; (19)
rMmL =
Mm + w   m
Lm   m
sm < sm; (20)
tM0m = t
   
L
m   Mm   w
Lm   Em
m; (21)
tMem = t
 +
Mm + w   Em
Lm   Em
m: (22)
The corresponding equations for single men are (5), (6), (10) and (11). Given
Mm + w > 
I
m, married men begin to leave later in the morning than single
men, but they then depart at a faster rate. This is because married men value
time at home more than unmarried men, and are therefore willing to incur more
congestion delay on their commute as a price for staying longer at home.12 As
explained below, this change in trip timing a¤ects utility for both men and
women.
For future reference we write the utilities for men who depart early or late:
UmE
 
tdm

=
 
Mm   m

tdm +
 
m   Em

tam + 
E
mt

m + 
W
m (Tm   tm) , (23)
UmL
 
tdm

=
 
Mm   m

tdm +
 
m   Lm

tam + 
L
mt

m + 
W
m (Tm   tm) : (24)
These formulas are counterparts to (3) and (4) for single individuals.
3.2 Equilibrium utilities
In this section we solve for average equilibrium utilities of men and women. Since
men depart for work at di¤erent times, their wives attain di¤erent utilities in
equilibrium. Similarly, except if  = 0 men attain di¤erent utilities as well even
though they leave home before their wives. It is straightforward but tedious
to derive average utilities for each sex (see the appendix). Average equilibrium
utility for men is given by the counterpart to eq. (15):
U
M
m = 
M
m t

m + 
W
m (Tm   tm)  (25)  
Lm   Mm   w
  
2
 
Mm   m

+ w
  
Mm   Em

+ 
Lm   Em
  
Mm   m

w  
 
Em   Mm   w

22w

2 (Lm   Em) (Mm + w   m)
m;
12Similar shifts occur in the Gubins and Verhoef (2011/2014) model when workers adopt
telecommuting technology and become more productive at home.
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where the bar in U
M
m indicates an average value. For women, the relevant
component of utility is the change in utility due to marriage which equals w
multiplied by the average value of tdm for men. This works out to:
U
M
w   U Iw = wN 1
Z N
n=0
tdm (n) dn = wt

m + U
IM
w , (26)
where
U
IM
w 
w
2 (Lm   Em)

"
2
 
Mm + w
  Em   Lm 
(Mm+w Em)(Lm Mm w)
Mm+w m
#
m:
Term wtm in eq. (26) is the increase in utility for women from marriage if
there were no congestion on the mens commuting route. This term will be
disregarded in assessing the welfare e¤ects of marriage on travel costs. The
remaining term, U
IM
w , is the utility (or disutility) caused by adjustments in
mens departure times due to tra¢ c congestion. This term is proportional to
the duration of congestion on the mens route, m.
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Eqs. (25) and (26) are rather complex, and do not yield easy-to-digest
results. We proceed in two steps. First, we assume that  = 0 so that men
disregard their wives utilities when choosing when to leave home. We refer
to this case as noncooperative couples. Second, we assume that  > 0 so
that men behave as if they attach a positive weight to their wivesutilities.
We refer to this case as cooperative couples. At each step we focus on how
changes in mens preferences a¤ect travel-related utility for the two sexes.
4 Noncooperative Equilibrium
4.1 Utility of men
With  = 0, all men receive the same utility in equilibrium because they disre-
gard their wivesutilities. Eq. (25) simplies to
UNm = 
M
m t

m + 
W
m (Tm   tm) 	Nmm; (27)
where N denotes the noncooperative equilibrium and 	Nm  (
Mm Em)(Lm Mm )
Lm Em .
The last term in (27) is the cost of congestion on the mens route:
CNm = 	
N
mm: (28)
Men experience a change in utility from marriage of:
UNm   U Im =
mt

m +
1
Lm Em
 
Im   Em
  
Lm   Im
   Mm   Em  Lm   Mm m =
13To understand this, note that if m = 0 all men would leave home at t

m in both the
singles and the couples equilibria. Marriage would not a¤ect mens departure times, and
there would be no spillover e¤ect on women.
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mt

m| {z }
>0
+
m
Lm   Em
 
Im + 
M
m
   Em + Lmm| {z }
UINm
: (29)
The rst term in eq. (29) is the utility gained from marriage if men encountered
no tra¢ c congestion. Similar to the treatment for women, this term will be
disregarded in assessing the welfare e¤ects of marriage on travel costs. The
second term, U INm , corresponds to the di¤erence in congestion costs for the
singles (I) and noncooperative-couples (N) equilibria which is proportional to:
 INm 
 
Im + 
M
m
   Em + Lm =  Im   Em| {z }
>0
   Lm   Mm | {z }
>0
: (30)
The signs of the two component terms in  INm follow from Assumption 2. Ex-
pression (30) can be positive or negative. This result is formalized as:
Proposition 1 (Marriage and congestion: men) If spouses do not coop-
erate when choosing their departure times, marriage may increase or decrease
utility due to congestion for men. Utility increases if
 
Im + 
M
m

>
 
Em + 
L
m

:
Loosely speaking, Proposition 1 says that mens utility increases if they
value time spent at home more than time spent at work. To see why, note that
disutility from congestion is governed by the strength of trip-timing preferences.
Before t, unmarried men prefer time at home to time at work by a margin
Im  Im   Em per minute. After t, they prefer to be at work by a margin
Im  Lm  Im. For given values of Em and Lm, congestion is most costly when
the two margins are equal because men then cannot exploit the lower cost by
arriving primarily early or primarily late. As noted above, since Mm > 
I
m,
marriage increases the penalty for arriving early and reduces the penalty for
arriving late as shown in Figure 2. Disutility from congestion is therefore lower
after marriage if Im is initially larger than 
I
m, a condition that translates into
the inequality in Proposition 1.
For future reference we rewrite the condition in Proposition 1 in terms of
unit costs:
U INm > 0()  INm s=
Im
Im
  
I
m
Im
+
m
Im
> 0, (31)
where s= means identical in sign. According to most empirical studies (e.g.,
Small (1982) and de Palma and Rochat (1997)), the unit cost of arriving late
at work () is several times as large as the unit cost of arriving early (). No
published empirical studies have estimated the size of the marital premiums,
m and w. Section 6 will present estimates suggesting that m and w are
fairly small compared to the ,  and  values. If so, condition (31) is likely to
be violated so that marriage increases disutility from congestion for men.
For the balance of this section and Section 5 it is useful to keep some bench-
mark values in mind. We take these to be m=m = 1=2 and m=m = 2.
We will also suppose that m=m and w=m are fairly small so that the val-
ues of m=m and m=m are similar for single and married individuals. These
parameter ratios will su¢ ce to sign the changes in utility that will be considered.
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4.2 Utility of women
In the noncooperative equilibrium, women are not a¤ected by tra¢ c congestion
on the mens route before marriage, but they are a¤ected after marriage because
their utility depends on when their husbands leave for work. With  = 0, eq.
(26) for womens average utility simplies somewhat to
U
IN
w =
w
2 (Lm   Em)
266664 Mm   Em| {z }
(a): Mm>0
   Lm   Mm | {z }
(b): Mm>0
 
 
Mm   Em
  
Lm   Mm

Mm   m| {z }
(c): Mm 
M
m =
M
m>0
377775m:
(32)
The e¤ect on women of tra¢ c congestion on the mens route is determined by
the sign of the expression in square brackets in eq. (32). This leads to:
Proposition 2 (Marriage and congestion: women) If spouses do not co-
operate when choosing their departure times, women benet from congestion on
the mens route if Mm   Em  
 
Lm   Mm
  (Mm Em)(Lm Mm )
Mm m > 0:
Converting this condition to unit costs, dividing through by Mm , and using
the benchmark parameter values, one obtains m=m   m=m   (m=m) 
(m=m) = 1=2  2  1=2  2 =  5=2. This suggests that women are likely to be
worse o¤ from congestion. The condition in Proposition 2 can also be written
U
IN
w > 0()  INw 
 
Im + m
 
Im + m

Im + 
I
m + 2m
  Im + m > 0: (33)
Similar to  INm for men,  
IN
w is an increasing function of the cost of early arrival
(Im), a decreasing function of the cost of late arrival (
I
m), and an increasing
function of m. Using (31) and (33) it is straightforward to show that
 INw    INm s=  
 
Im
Im
!2
+
 
1  
I
m
Im
!
m
Im
+

m
Im
2
. (34)
Expression (34) is negative for small values ofm. Thus, if the marital premium
for men is small, women are more likely than men to su¤er from tra¢ c congestion
on the mens route.
Assumption 2 requires m < Im. If m is close to 
I
m, (34) is positive when
Im  Im in which case women lose less than men. It is therefore possible for
either sex to benet while the other sex loses. Nevertheless, it is clear from (33)
that  INw < 
I
m   Im + 2m. Thus, if Im > Im + 2m  consistent with the
benchmark parameter values  men and women are both worse o¤. Men lose
because the opportunity cost of arriving early at work increases proportionally
more than the opportunity cost of arriving late decreases. Women lose because
congestion induces men to leave home earlier on average, which increases the
time women spend at home alone.
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4.3 Utility of couples
The e¤ect of marriage on couples utility can be determined from eqs. (29) and
(32). The average change in couples utility, U
IN
c , works out to
U
IN
c  U INm + U
IN
w
s
=
 
Im + 
M
m  
 
Em + 
L
m

m+ (35)
w
2
  
Mm   Em
   Lm   Mm    Mm   Em  Lm   Mm Mm   m
!
:
Translated to unit costs, the condition for a couples utility to increase is:
U
IN
c > 0()

2

1 +
m
m

m
m
+

1 +
m
m
+ 2
m
m

w
m

m
m
< (36)
2

1 +
m
m

m
m
+
m
m

w
m
+
 
m
m
+ 2

1 +
m
m

m
m
+ 3

m
m
2!
w
m
:
Clearly, condition (36) is satised if conditions (31) and (33) are both satised,
and violated if both conditions are violated. With the benchmark parameter
values, and assuming w = m, (36) is violated for all admissible values of m.
It is therefore plausible that marriage causes the costs of congestion to increase
for both sexes. It is of interest to compare this nding with that of Gubins
and Verhoef (2011/2014) who analyze the e¤ects of teleworking technology on
welfare. They show that, although the socially optimal penetration rate of the
technology may be less than 100 percent, full penetration is always preferable
to zero penetration. The reason for this is that they include in their welfare
accounting the benets that individuals derive from teleworking while at home.
By contrast, we disregard the marital premium in utility received by couples
while at home together.
5 Cooperative equilibrium
Section 4 considered the noncooperative-couples equilibrium in which spouses
disregard each others utilities. We now take the second step in assessing the
e¤ects of marriage by considering a cooperative-couples regime in which, as
in Section 3, men place a weight  > 0 on their wifes utility. We derive the
cooperative-couples equilibrium and compare it with the noncooperative-couples
equilibrium.
The di¤erence between the two regimes naturally depends on the size of .
Picard et al. (2013) have derived estimates of  using mode choice data from
the 1999 French General Census. With the Pareto weight on mens utility nor-
malized to 1, their estimates of  for women range from 1:01 to 1:22 depending
on the number of vehicles in the household. This suggests that a reasonable
benchmark value to use for the cooperative-couples regime is 1, which we will
call balancedcooperation.
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Intuition suggests that cooperation between spouses raises their joint utility.
However, because congestion is an uninternalized externality in the model it is
not clear a priori whether cooperation within couples benets travelers overall.
Section 4 established that marriage can increase the costs of tra¢ c congestion for
both sexes. This happens when the higher utility for married men while at home
(m) raises the cost of departing early proportionally more than it reduces the
cost of departing late. Men start to depart later (cf. eq. (21)), and then depart
more rapidly (cf. eq. (19)). In a cooperative equilibrium with  > 0, these
changes are reinforced because men behave as if their utility at home increases
by an additional w. The welfare impacts of the two changes are di¤erent
because the mans marriage premium, m, a¤ects his utility directly whereas
the womans marriage premium, w, does not because men are assumed not to
care directly about their wifes utility. Nevertheless, altruism can leave one or
both sexes worse o¤ as shown below.
5.1 Utility of men
Consider rst how cooperation a¤ects utility of men. Utility for the rst man
to depart is derived by substituting eq. (21) for tM0m into eq. (23):
UCmE (t0m) = 
M
m t

m+
W
m (Tm   tm) 
 
Mm   Em
  
Lm   Mm   w

Lm   Em
m, (37)
where the superscript C denotes cooperation. Given w > 0, it follows from
eq. (37) that the rst man to depart is better o¤ when men cooperate. This is
because cooperation induces men to postpone leaving home, and the rst man
arrives at work closer to tm without incurring any queuing delay. The utility of
the last man to depart is derived by substituting eq. (22) for tMem into eq. (24):
UCmL (tem) = 
M
m t

m+
W
m (Tm   tm) 
 
Mm   Em + w
  
Lm   Mm

Lm   Em
m: (38)
The last man to depart is worse o¤ in the cooperative equilibrium because he
incurs a higher late-arrival cost. Thus, some men gain from cooperation and
others lose.
Using eqs. (25) and (27) the change in average mens utility can be written
U
NC
m  U
C
m UNm =
Em
 
m   Lm

+ Mm
 
Mm   2m

+ Lmm   22w
2 (Lm   Em) (Mm + w   m)
wm:
(39)
The condition for mens average utility to increase is:
U
NC
m > 0 ()
Em
 
m   Lm

+ Mm
 
Mm   2m

+ Lmm   22w > 0. (40)
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Condition (40) can be written in terms of parameter ratios:
U
NC
m > 0 ()  NCm  (41)
m
m
 

1  m
m

m
m
+ 2
m
m
+

m
m
2
  2

w
m
2
> 0;
where superscript I on m, m, and m is omitted to avoid notational clutter.
Condition (41) is less stringent than condition (31) for men to benet from
marriage, but it can still be violated. Since m < m,  
NC
m is a decreasing
function of m. Thus, men su¤er from cooperation if late arrival is very costly.
Function  NCm is increasing with m so that men are more likely to benet
if their marital premium is large. However,  NCm is decreasing with w since
larger values of w induce men to sacrice more personal utility for their wives.
Consider the benchmark values of m=m = 0:5 and m=m = 2. If there
is balanced cooperation, and men and women have equal marital premiums,
w = m.  NCm is negative for m=m < 0:25, and positive for m=m >
0:25. If, instead, couples are noncooperative, so that w = 0,  NCm is negative
for m=m < 0:225, and positive for m=m > 0:225. In both cases men are
better o¤ only if their marital premium is appreciable.
5.2 Utility of women
The e¤ect of cooperation on women depends on how men change their departure
times. To facilitate comparisons it will be assumed that men depart in the
same order in the cooperative and noncooperative regimes. Since cooperation
postpones departures by increasing the e¤ective cost of leaving home early, the
rst and last men to depart leave home later and their wives benet. But since
men depart more rapidly during the rush hour, it is possible for some to leave
earlier than in the noncooperative regime to the detriment of their wives. It is
straightforward to show (see the appendix) that all women end up better o¤ if
   vEm   vm  vLm   vMm + vMm   vm2 + vMm   vm + vEm   vmw > 0: (42)
Condition (42) can be written in terms of costs as
 

1  m
m

m
m
+1+

3  m
m

m
m
+

m
m
2
+

2  m
m
+
m
m

w
m
> 0:
(43)
All terms on the left-hand side are positive except the rst which decreases with
m. Thus, all women benet if the cost of arriving late for men is not too large.
With the benchmark parameter values, (43) is satised as long as m > 0 or
w > 0. If (43) is not satised, then some women are worse o¤ (and their
spouses are too).
Eq. (26) can be used to determine whether women are better or worse o¤ on
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average. Subtracting eq. (26) with  = 0 from eq. (26) with  > 0 one obtains
U
NC
w  U
C
w   U
N
w = (44)

2w
 
3
 
vMm   vm
  
vMm + w   vm
   vLm   vm  vEm   vm
2 (vMm   vm) (vMm + w   vm) (vLm   vEm)
m:
The condition for average utility to increase is
U
NC
w > 0 () (45)
3
 
vMm   vm
  
vMm + w   vm
   vLm   vm  vEm   vm > 0;
which can be written in terms of costs as
U
NC
w > 0 ()  NCw  (46)
m
m
 

1  m
m

m
m
+ 2 + 3
m
m
+ 3

1 +
m
m

m + w
m
> 0:
Condition (46) is less stringent than condition (41) or condition (42), and it is
satised with the benchmark parameter values. Thus, as might be expected,
when spouses cooperate, women are more likely to benet in aggregate than
men. Nevertheless, cooperation can leave women worse o¤ if late arrival is
su¢ ciently costly for men. As noted above, the reason is that men depart
more quickly once the travel period begins (cf. eq. (19)). If late arrival is
very costly for men, cooperation postpones the rst departure only slightly and
the accelerated departure rate thereafter results in an earlier average departure
time.
5.3 Utility of couples
Let U
NC
c denote the average di¤erence in utility for couples between the coop-
erative and noncooperative equilibria. The e¤ects of cooperation on the average
utilities of men and women are given by eqs. (39) and (44) respectively. Adding
these equations yields:
U
NC
c  U
C
c   U
N
c
s
= 
Mm + w   m
 h 
Mm   m
2    vEm   m  vLm   m+ 2  Mm   mwi
   Mm   m (1  ) (2  ) 2w: (47)
Average utility for couples clearly increases if it increases for both sexes as per
(40) and (45). With balanced cooperation ( = 1), the second line of (47) is
zero and condition (47) can be written in terms of unit costs as
(with  = 1:) U
NC
c > 0 ()
m
m
 

1  m
m

m
m
+ 2
m
m
+

m
m
2
+ 2

1 +
m
m

w
m
> 0. (48)
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Couples are more likely to benet from balanced cooperation if late arrival is
not too costly and if both spouses have a large marital premium. With the
benchmark values of m=m and m=m, and w = m, (48) is satised for
m=m > 0:115.
The results of this subsection are summarized in:
Proposition 3 (Benets of cooperation) Suppose that couples begin to co-
operate. Men who depart near the beginning of the rush hour are better o¤, and
men who depart near the end are worse o¤. As a group, men can be better or
worse o¤. Wives of men who depart near the beginning or end of the rush hour
are better o¤, and it is possible for all women to be better o¤. Women as a
group are always better o¤ if men are better o¤, but it is possible for both sexes
to lose. Couples are more likely to benet overall if their marital premiums are
strong.
The results of this section reveal that the e¤ects of cooperation between
couples are rather complex, and depend on the values of several parameters.
Some individuals always gain, but in the aggregate it is possible for losses to
outweigh the gains.
6 Empirical evidence on preferences
6.1 Empirical results
In order to estimate the parameters dening couples trip-timing preferences
we designed a survey, MIMETTIC, which was administered in 2011 and 2012
by TNS-SOFRES, a large international survey company, on a sample of 5,210
individuals including 1,047 couples. All the respondents lived in the Greater
Paris region (Ile-de-France).14 The questionnaire comprised three parts. Part 1
described the household. Part 2 was an individual questionnaire to be completed
separately by the main respondent and (if applicable) by his/her spouse. Part
3 was restricted to couples in which both spouses had completed the individual
questionnaire. Part 3 was completed a few days after the rst two parts, and
could be completed by spouses either separately or together.
We focus here on Part 3 of the questionnaire which featured hypothetical
scenarios designed to measure the value of time of each spouse at home before the
morning commute, either alone or with the spouse present. (To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst survey to estimate such value of time di¤erentials.)
These stated preference questions were designed on the basis of actual trips in
terms of mode, trip purpose, departure time and travel time. Commuting trips
14The survey was nanced by the French Ministry of Transport and Sustain-
able Development Agency, under the two Predit projects 09 MT CV 13 and 09
MT CV 14. The content of the survey is described in the annex to the re-
port of project 09 MT CV 13, available at http://temis.documentation.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/documents/Temis/0076/Temis-0076535/20339_A.pdf. (Picard and de
Palma, 2012).
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were oversampled. An example of a scenario as presented to survey participants
is as follows:
Consider your commuting trip by car. You left at 7:30. Assume you will
have a similar trip, in similar conditions, except concerning departure time and
travel time. We ask you to imagine that your spouse leaves far before you so
that, whatever the case, you are alone when you leave. You have the choice
between two alternatives. Which one do you prefer?
Alternative 1: You leave at 7:30 (td1) and your travel time is 30 minutes (tt1).
Alternative 2: You leave at 7:45 (td2) and your travel time is 40 minutes
(tt2).
Consider a person living alone who arrives at work early, and denote travel
time in scenario i by tti. Given eq. (3), indi¤erence between Alternatives 1 and
2 corresponds to: 
I    td1 +     E  td1 + tt1+ Et + W (T   t)
=
 
I    td2 +     E  td2 + tt2+ Et + W (T   t)
,  I    td1 +     E  td1 + tt1 =  I    td2 +     E  td2 + tt2
,  I   E td1 +     E tt1 =  I   E td2 +     E tt2
,  E    (tt2   tt1) =  I   E  td2   td1
, I E
E  =
tt2 tt1
td2 td1
:
The individual prefers alternative 1 if 
I E
E  <
tt2 tt1
td2 td1
, and alternative 2 if
I E
E  >
tt2 tt1
td2 td1
. Given Assumption 1, I > E >  and the left-hand side of
the last equality is positive. Hence, as long as td2   td1 > 0 and tt2   tt1 > 0,
there exists a user with valid preferences who is indi¤erent between the two
alternatives.
A second question was asked  the content of which depended on the answer
to the rst question. The travel times and departure times used in the second
question are indexed by 3 and 4 if alternative 1 was selected in the rst question,
and by 5 and 6 if alternative 2 was selected in the rst question. Travel times
and departure times were selected around the actual travel time and departure
time so that the scenario was plausible for the respondent. They were selected
randomly in order to solve the endogeneity problem explained in de Palma and
Picard (2005). The experiment was designed such that tt4 tt3
td4 td3
< tt2 tt1
td2 td1
<
tt6 tt5
td6 td5
in all scenarios (and such that the respondent was always alone when
s/he left home). The answers to the two questions established upper and/or
lower bounds on the ratio 
I E
E  . Four cases could arise.
 The respondent selected alternative 1 for the rst question and alternative
3 for the second question. Then 
I E
E  <
tt4 tt3
td4 td3
.
 The respondent selected alternative 1 for the rst question and alternative
4 for the second question. Then tt4 tt3
td4 td3
< 
I E
E  <
tt2 tt1
td2 td1
.
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 The respondent selected alternative 2 for the rst question and alternative
5 for the second question. Then tt2 tt1
td2 td1
< 
I E
E  <
tt6 tt5
td6 td5
.
 The respondent selected alternative 2 for the rst question and alternative
6 for the second question. Then tt6 tt5
td6 td5
< 
I E
E  .
The second question was not asked when it would have generated values too
close to the values of the rst question since the respondent might have been
unable to perceive the di¤erence between the questions. In such instances, the
only conclusion that could be drawn was either 
I E
E  <
tt2 tt1
td2 td1
or 
I E
E  >
tt2 tt1
td2 td1
.
We used an ordered logit-type model to estimate the value of 
I E
E  for
each sex.15 This model was extended as described in Picard and Wol¤ (2010)
to accommodate missing information when the second question was not asked.
A similar procedure was used to estimate the value of time with a spouse
present, 
M E
E  . In this case, all the departure times used in the three questions
were such that the spouse was still present when the respondent was supposed
to leave, in all the alternatives of the corresponding scenarios. An example of
the wording is as follows:
Consider your commuting trip by car. You left at 7:30. Assume you will
have a similar trip, in similar conditions, except concerning departure time and
travel time. We ask you to imagine that your spouse leaves far after you so
that, whatever the case, she is at home with you when you leave. You have the
choice between two alternatives. Which one do you prefer?
We used a sub-sample of 327 women and 369 men without children, who
both commuted either by car or by public transit the day before the survey,
and answered the relevant hypothetical scenarios. In this sample, the man left
before the woman in 62% of cases, the man and woman left at the same time in
4% of cases, and the woman left before the man in the remaining 34% of cases.
Consistent with the theoretical model described above, parameters are as-
sumed homogeneous in the male population, and homogeneous in the female
population. More precisely, we assume that 
I E
E  (resp.
M E
E  ) is an individual-
specic random (gaussian) variable with gender-specic expectation. The esti-
mated parameters thus correspond to the average values of 
I E
E  and
M E
E 
15The fact that the departure and travel times considered in the second question depend
on the answer to the rst question would induce an endogeneity bias if we used a simple
binary logit model to analyze the answer to the second question. de Palma and Picard (2005)
show that this bias, which can be very large, can be corrected by using an ordered-logit type
model. de Palma, Picard and Ziegelmeyer (2011) show that combining a tree structure to
ask questions, and applying an ordered logit (or probit) model, improves the accuracy of the
results compared to using one-stage questions and a simple binary logit model.
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in the male and female populations. We estimated the parameters assuming
that 
I E
E  and
M E
E  are independent of each other, as well as independent
between spouses. We then checked the robustness of the results to the corre-
lation between the two parameters as well as between spouses. For this last
series of estimates, the sample was reduced to the 227 couples in which both
spouses answered the two questions. Parameters are estimated using maximum
likelihood. The individual-specic likelihood corresponds to the probability of
the answer selected by the respondent. When parameters are assumed indepen-
dent, the four ratios can be estimated separately (i.e., 
I E
E  and
M E
E  in the
male and female populations). Let  denote the c.d.f. of a normal distribution
with zero-mean and gender-specic variance, estimated simultaneously with the
other parameters. The individual-specic likelihood is given by:
 P

I E
E  <
tt4 tt3
td4 td3

= 

tt4 tt3
td4 td3

if the respondent selected alternative
1 for the rst question and alternative 3 for the second question.
 P

tt4 tt3
td4 td3
< 
I E
E  <
tt2 tt1
td2 td1

= 

tt2 tt1
td2 td1

  

tt4 tt3
td4 td3

if the respon-
dent selected alternative 1 for the rst question and alternative 4 for the
second question.
 P

tt2 tt1
td2 td1
< 
I E
E  <
tt6 tt5
td6 td5

= 

tt6 tt5
td6 td5

  

tt2 tt1
td2 td1

if the respon-
dent selected alternative 2 for the rst question and alternative 5 for the
second question.
 P

tt6 tt5
td6 td5
< 
I E
E 

= 1 

tt6 tt5
td6 td5

if the respondent selected alterna-
tive 2 for the rst question and alternative 6 for the second question.
 P

I E
E  <
tt2 tt1
td2 td1

= 

tt2 tt1
td2 td1

if the respondent selected alternative
1 for the rst question and was not asked a second question.
 P

I E
E  >
tt2 tt1
td2 td1

= 1 

tt2 tt1
td2 td1

if the respondent selected alterna-
tive 2 for the rst question and was not asked a second question.
The extension to correlated parameters is straightforward but more cumber-
some. It relies on the c.d.f. of a multivate normal.
The estimates were very similar with and without correlations, so we se-
lected the most e¢ cient estimates (obtained in a larger sample) assuming no
correlation. These are reported in Table 1
The estimates for the value of time late (i.e., 
L I
I E ) were obtained from
a previous survey, MADDIF, using the same methodology as the one used in
MIMETTIC. This ratio was estimated jointly for men and women since no
signicant di¤erences by gender were found. Combining the results of the two
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men women
Correlated 
M E
E  =
M
M M 0.8421 0.5817
I E
E  =
I
I I 0.4563 0.5347
Independent 
M E
E  =
M
M M 0.7074 0.5470
I E
E  =
I
I I 0.4741 0.5004
Table 1: Parameter estimates: independent and correlated parameters
surveys (assuming independence of the parameters), we obtain three ratios for
each gender. The results are reported in Table 2.
men women
L I
I E =
I
I
1.5941 1.5941
M E
E  =
M
M M 0.7074 0.5470
I E
E  =
I
I I 0.4741 0.5004
Table 2: Parameter estimates
No constraint was imposed on the parameters to be estimated. Nevertheless,
the estimated values for 
I E
E  ,
M E
E  , and the marital premiums were all
positive, consistent with the rankings in (2) and (18). Given the estimates in
Table 2, parameters of interest are easily computed. For example, 
I
m
Im Im =
1
m
m
 1 = 0:4741. Hence
m
m
= 10:4741 + 1 = 3:1093 and
m
m
= 13:1093 = 0:32162.
The other estimates are m=m = 0:51269, m=m = 0:1583, and w=m =
0:0311.
6.2 Application of the estimates
In this subsection we apply the parameter estimates to the formulas derived
in Sections 2 to 5. Without a¤ecting results of interest, we normalize mens
work-start time to tm = 0, and set m = 2 so that the departure period lasts
for 2 hours. We also set m to e10. The results are shown in Table 3.
Panel (a): If men live alone, they depart during the time interval

tI0m; t
I
em

=
[ 1:23; 0:77] so that a little over three-fths arrive at work early. The cost of
congestion per commuter is about e4.
Panel (b): In the noncooperative equilibrium after marriage, men depart
during the time interval

tN0m; t
N
em

= [ 0:85; 1:15] which is about 23 mins later
than before marriage. The cost of congestion rises by about e0:12. Women
incur only a slight cost from congestion on the mens route of e0:008. The
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cost is small because womens marital premium is small, and mens average
departure time turns out to be only about 1:5 mins later than when they are
single. In the balanced cooperative equilibrium, departures begin about 4 mins
later still. Congestion costs for men drop by about e0:10, and women actually
benet slightly from the congestion because men leave home after tm on average.
In summary, marriage raises the costs of congestion moderately on the mens
route when men do not cooperate, but most of the extra cost is eliminated in
the case of balanced cooperation.
Costs and changes in costs
Men Women Couples
(a) Equilibrium with single individuals
t0m =  1:23 3:953  
(b) Equilibria for married individuals
Noncooperative t0m =  0:85 4:078 0:008 4:085
Cooperative t0m =  0:78 3:979  0:018 3:961
Table 3: Costs and e¢ ciency gains for numerical example
The results in Table 3 pertain only to one particular set of parameter values.
Figures 3 and 4 present a more comprehensive view of how the the marital
premiums inuence the benets of cooperation. Figure 3 depicts the e¤ects of
marriage on utilities in the noncooperative equilibrium. Both sexes are worse
o¤ if m, the marital premium of men, is less than about 17 percent of mens
VOT. For slightly larger values of m women benet (W ), then women and
couples (W;C), and nally men as well (M;W;C). The point estimates of
m=m = 0:1583 and w=m = 0:0311 shown by the black dot lie close to
the transition zone so that the utility losses reported in Table 3 are rather
tenuous. Figure 4 shows the e¤ects of cooperation on utilities. Women and
couples benet for all values of m=m and w=m. Men benet as well if
their marital premium is not too small compared to womens.
The estimates of m=m = 0:32162 and m=m = 0:51269 from our study
are smaller than for most earlier studies, and the low value of m=m is atyp-
ical. To assess the robustness of the results, the analysis is repeated using the
benchmark parameter values m=m = 0:5 and m=m = 2 considered ear-
lier. Results are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 reveals that the e¤ects
of marriage are much less favorable than with the new estimates since neither
sex benets unless m=m exceeds about 1:1. Although theoretically possible,
such high values seem implausible. Cooperation is also less benecial than with
the new estimates (compare Figure 6 with Figure 4) although the di¤erence is
modest. For very small values of m=m and w=m, women gain slightly
from cooperation but men lose by more so that couples end up worse o¤.
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Figure 3: Who gains in transition from single to noncooperative couples equi-
librium: New parameter estimates
Figure 4: Who gains in transition from noncooperative to cooperative couples
equilibrium: New parameter estimates
24
Figure 5: Who gains in transition from single to noncooperative couples equi-
librium: Benchmark parameters
Figure 6: Who gains in transition from noncooperative to cooperative couples
equilibrium: Benchmark parameters
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7 Conclusions
This paper has examined the evolution of tra¢ c congestion when trip-timing
decisions are made by family members with interdependent preferences. We
consider the specic case of couples who value time at home more when they
are together than when alone. The additional utility or marital premiummay
di¤er between the sexes. One spouse (assumed to be the man) leaves for work
rst. His marital premium induces him to postpone leaving home. Leaving
home later also benets his wife. The degree to which the man accounts for this
departure-time externality is characterized by a nonnegative Pareto weight. No
cooperation corresponds to the limiting case of 0, and balanced cooperation to
a value of 1. The man is assumed not to derive utility from his wifes utility per
se.16
Our analysis focuses on how the costs of tra¢ c congestion are a¤ected by
the changes in trip-timing preferences induced by marriage. Two main con-
clusions emerge. First, the costs of congestion can be higher for both sexes
in the noncooperative-couples equilibrium than in the equilibrium with single
individuals. Costs increase for men because the opportunity cost per minute of
arriving early at work increases proportionally more than the opportunity cost
per minute of late arrival falls. Costs increase for women because congestion
induces men to leave home earlier on average, and thus spend less time at home.
Second, cooperation has mixed e¤ects on welfare. Men who depart near the
beginning of the rush hour are better o¤, and men who depart near the end
are worse o¤. As a group, men can be better or worse o¤. Wives of men who
depart near the beginning or end of the rush hour are better o¤. It is possible
for all women to be better o¤, but also possible for them to be worse o¤ on
average. Moreover, both members of a couple can lose. Couples are more likely
to benet overall if their marital premiums are strong.
A notable feature of our paper is that schedule coordination a¤ects tra¢ c
congestion and utility even though coordination occurs only within couples who
each contribute a negligible portion (i.e., measure zero) of total travel demand.
This contrasts with studies of atomic congestion games in which individual users
such as major freight shippers control a positive fraction of total tra¢ c, and have
incentive to internalize the congestion costs their tra¢ c imposes on itself.
Our analysis has focused on how marriage a¤ects tra¢ c congestion rather
than overall household utility. A more general assessment of the e¤ects of mar-
riage, as well as other household decisions, could be undertaken using an ex-
tension of the household activity framework adopted here. Indeed, there are
various avenues for further research. A particularly restrictive assumption in
our model is that men and women do not use the same commuting route, and
hence do not interfere with each other on the roads. An alternative is the op-
posite extreme in which men and women use the same route. However, this
16The man is thus assumed to have nondeferential preferences. It can be shown that the
mans departure time in our model is the same as if he had caring preferences, and  represents
his degree of altruism, that is the weight he attaches to his wifes utility. These two models
of interaction within couples di¤er only in terms of welfare analysis.
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setting is much more complicated to analyze than separate routes even if men
and women are assumed to have the same marital premium and other utility
parameters  which is not the case for our empirical estimates.17
One important dimension of behavior omitted from the model is the care
of children which can be challenging if both spouses work outside the home.
Couples must decide who takes the children to school and when, who brings
them back home, and who transports them to out-of-school activities. A parent
has to trade o¤ not only his/her schedule convenience with that of his/her
spouse, but also the schedules of children. Traditionally, women have borne
the lions share of child-care and other household responsibilities. Although
men are gradually shouldering more of the burden, employed women still face
tighter time constraints, and this is one reason why they tend to work closer
to home (Turner and Niemeier, 1997) and exhibit di¤erent travel patterns than
men (Schintler, 2001).
Another limitation of the model is that it ignores agglomeration economies
at work. Agglomeration economies between workers in the same rm or estab-
lishment may be partially or fully internalized by employers, but they are likely
to remain largely uninternalized between institutions. As Fosgerau and Small
(2014) show, agglomeration economies at work or at home increase the cost of
congestion and the corresponding benets from congestion pricing.
In our model congestion pricing of the mens commuting route would a¤ect
not only the men who use it, but also their spouses because of changes in mens
departure-time decisions. Expanding bottleneck capacity on the mens route
(sm) would have spillover e¤ects as well. These e¤ects are relatively easy to
discern. Before marriage, the cost of congestion for men is given by CIm in
eq. (17). The marginal benet of capacity expansion per man is @CIm=@sm =
CIm=sm. After marriage, the cost of congestion is given by C
N
m in eq. (28), and
the marginal benet of capacity expansion per man is @CNm=@sm = C
N
m=sm.
Expanding capacity is therefore more benecial for men after marriage if CNm >
CIm; i.e. when the condition identied in Prop. 1 is violated. For women,
expanding sm is benecial if congestion on the mens route leaves women worse
o¤; i.e. if U
IN
w < 0 or the condition identied in Prop. 2 is violated. In
a similar way, the benets of capacity expansion for men and women in the
cooperative equilibrium can be compared with the benets in the noncooperative
equilibrium using conditions (41) and (46) respectively.
Another limitation of the model is that it is restricted to the morning com-
mute. The evening commute is arguably as important as the morning commute,
and including the evening would extend the model closer to a full day of house-
hold activity. If morning and evening commute timing decisions are assumed
to be independent, a model of the evening parallel to the morning model here
can be used. Preliminary analysis of the model indicates that the results are
17 If men and women commute on the same route, and have the same marital premium,
the size of the premium determines both the order in which individuals depart and whether
spouses leave home at the same time. The qualitative pattern of departures changes several
times as the premium increases.
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very similar.18 We o¤er a sketch here. Let vE denote the cost per minute of
leaving work early, and vL the value of time spent at work late. Other utility
parameters are dened as for the morning. The parameter ranking for each sex
becomes vE > vM  vI > vL > v: For a married person the unit cost of leaving
work early in the evening is eve = vE   vM , and the unit cost of leaving late
is eve = vM   vL. In the morning model it is assumed that men leave home
for work earlier than women (if women work out of home at all). If the two
sexes have similar work hours, men will return home rst in the evening and
the departure times of women from work will a¤ect the utility of men. The
marital premium now reduces the opportunity cost of leaving work early for
women, and increases their opportunity cost of leaving late. Empirical evidence
is scant, but it is reasonable to assume that eve > eve. Just as in the morning
model, marriage brings the costs of early and late departure into closer balance.
All the qualitative results derived in the paper for the morning commute then
carry over to the evening commute.
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10 Notational Glossary
10.1 Numbers of users
N : number of men, number of women, and number of couples
NE : number of individuals who arrive early
NL : number of individuals who arrive late
s : bottleneck capacity [veh./hr]
 : N=s [hr]
10.2 Preferences
t : desired arrival time at work
U : utility
I : utility from time spent at home alone [per minute]
M : utility from time spent at home with spouse [per minute]
 : utility from time spent driving [per minute]
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E : utility from time spent at work before t [per minute]
W : utility from time spent at work during regular hours [per minute]
P : (dis)utility of time missed from work due to late arrival [per minute]
L = W  P : loss of utility from not being at work during regular hours [per
minute].
  =
 
Im + 
M
m
   Em + Lm
 = M   I [per minute]
 : Pareto weight
	I =
(I E)(L I)
L E
	N =
(Mm Em)(Lm Mm )
Lm Em
10.3 Times of day
td : departure time from home
ta : arrival time at work
t0 : time when rst individual leaves home
te : time when last individual leaves homeet : departure time for which individual arrives on time
T : end of accounting day
tmE : average departure time of men who arrive early
tmL : average departure time of men who arrive late
10.4 Flows and delays
C : cost of congestion
r : aggregate departure rate from home
q
 
td

= ta   td : queuing delay = trip duration for trip departing at td
10.5 Subscripts, superscripts, and regimes
E : superscript for early arrival
L : superscript for late arrival
I : superscript for individuals
M : superscript for marriage
c : subscript for couples
m : subscript for men
w : subscript for women
N : noncooperative-couples equilibrium
C : cooperative-couples equilibrium
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11 Appendix
11.1 Mean utility of married men
The mean utility can be calculated using the formula
U
M
m =
NmE
N
U
M
mE +
NmL
N
U
M
mL,
where NmE is the number of men who arrive early, NmL is the number who
arrive late, U
M
mE is the mean utility of men who arrive early, and U
M
mL is the
mean utility of men who arrive late. NmE and NmL are given respectively by
the counterparts to eqs. (13) and (14):
NmE =
Lm   Mm   w
Lm   Em
N; (49)
NmL =
Mm + w   Em
Lm   Em
N: (50)
Since utilities vary linearly with departure time,
U
M
mE =
1
2
 
UmE
 
tM0m

+ UmE
 
~tMm

,
U
M
mL =
1
2
 
UmE
 
~tMm

+ UmL
 
tMem

.
Substituting eq. (21) in the text for tM0m into (23) gives
UmE
 
tM0m

= Mm t

m + 
W
m (Tm   tm) 
 
Mm   Em
  
Lm   Mm   w

Lm   Em
m.
Substituting (22) for tMem into (24) gives
UmL
 
tMem

= Mm t

m + 
W
m (Tm   tm) 
 
Mm   Em + w
  
Lm   Mm

Lm   Em
m.
On-time departure time, ~tMm , is given by the counterpart to eq. (12):
~tMm = t

m  
 
Mm + w   Em
  
Lm   Mm   w

(Mm + w   m) (Lm   Em)
m: (51)
Using (51), (19), and (23) yields
UmE
 etMm  = Mm tm+Wm (Tm   tm)  Mm   m  Mm + w   Em  Lm   Mm   w(Mm + w   m) (Lm   Em) m.
Routine substitution then yields eq. (25).
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11.2 Mean departure time of men
The integral term in eq. (26) can be written:Z N
n=0
tdm (n) dn = NmEtmE +NmLtmL, (52)
where tmE is the average departure time of men who arrive early, and tmL is the
average departure time of men who arrive late. The departure rate is constant
during the early arrival period, [tM0m; ~t
M
m ), and constant during the late arrival
period, (~tMm ; t
M
em]. Therefore
tmE =
tM0m + ~t
M
m
2
; (53)
and
tmL =
~tMm + t
M
em
2
: (54)
tM0m and t
M
em are given by eqs. (21) and (22). Using the above equations it
follows that Z N
n=0
tdm (n) dn = t

mN +
1
2 (Lm   Em)
"
2
 
Mm + w
  Em   Lm    Mm + w   Em  Lm   Mm   wMm + w   m
#
mN ,
(55)
which yields eq. (26) in the text.
11.3 Condition for all women to benet from cooperation
All women benet from cooperation if all men depart later in the cooperative
equilibrium than the noncooperative equilibrium. The cooperative equilibrium
begins later, but the departure rate is higher for both early and late arrival.
It is therefore necessary to check whether the cumulative departures curve for
the cooperative equilibrium catches up to the cumulative departures curve for
the noncooperative equilibrium. At time ~tMm , a man arrives on time in the
cooperative equilibrium. At this point NmE men have departed in the coop-
erative equilibrium. Let btN denote the time at which NmE have departed in
the noncooperative equilibrium. If btN < ~tMm , then all men depart earlier in the
noncooperative equilibrium and all women are better o¤. Time btN is solved
using the formula btN = tM0m>0 + NmE j>0rNmE=0
tM0m is given by eq. (21), NmE by eq. (49), and r
N
mE by eq. (19) with  = 0:
Making the substitutions one obtains
btN = tm  
  
Lm   Mm
  
Mm   Em

Mm   m
+
Em   m
Mm   m
w
!
m
Lm   Em
. (56)
34
Given eqs. (56) and (51), the condition btN < ~tMm reduces to condition (42) in
the text.
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